untitled

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 10, 2009

Decided February 5, 2010

No. 07-3125

NITED

TATES OF

MERICA

PPELLEE

AMUEL

INTON

PPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 06cr00298-01)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.
J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

James M. Perez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roy W.
McLeese III and Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: B

ROWN

and K

AVANAUGH

, Circuit Judges, and

ILLIAMS

, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge B

ROWN

, Circuit Judge: Samuel Vinton, convicted of

narcotics and firearm offenses after the contraband was found
in a briefcase in his car during a traffic stop, appeals the
denial of his motion to suppress. He argues the evidence was
discovered during an unconstitutional search of his vehicle
and property. In particular, he contends that Arizona v. Gant,
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), decided by the Supreme Court while
this appeal was pending, establishes that the search of the
briefcase cannot be upheld under the search-incident-to-arrest
exception to the warrant requirement. Because it was
“reasonable to believe” evidence relevant to Vinton’s
weapons-possession offense would be found inside the
briefcase, we affirm.

On September 9, 2006, around 9:00 p.m., U.S. Park

Police Officer William Alton, driving a marked cruiser in
Southeast D.C., saw a green Nissan Maxima speeding, and
also observed that its windows were excessively tinted. Tr. of
Mot. Hr’g at 6, 8, 69, United States v. Vinton, No. 06-cr-298
(D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2007) (Suppression Tr.). As Alton followed
the car, he noticed “a thin blue line sticker on the back of
[the] car,” which Alton assumed referred to the driver’s
probable affiliation with law enforcement, most likely the
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). Id. at 8, 70.

The driver promptly obeyed Alton’s signal to pull over

and, as Alton approached the car, the driver, Vinton, lowered
all his windows. Id. at 10, 70. Alton asked if Vinton was in
law enforcement and Vinton said he worked in “personal
security.” Id. at 11, 71. Alton immediately saw a knife with

a five-and-a-half inch sheath on Vinton’s backseat, in “close
proximity” to Vinton, easily within reaching-distance. Id. at
11–12, 25, 37, 70–71. Vinton explained the knife was used
when fishing with his grandfather, but Alton saw no other
fishing equipment in the car. Id. at 12, 14, 71. He retrieved
the knife and placed it on the roof of the car, “out of arm’s
reach of the driver.” Id. at 14, 71. Alton asked if there were
“any other weapons in the vehicle,” and Vinton responded
“no, he . . . ke[pt] that part of his trade at home.” Id. at 14,
71. Alton then measured the car’s windows with a tint meter
and determined they exceeded D.C.’s seventy-percent tint
limit. Id. at 15–17, 71. He returned to his cruiser to prepare a
citation. Id. at 17, 72.

Officer Alton was working alone and had not called for

Park Police backup. However, when an MPD officer
appeared, Alton “asked him to stop” because he had found a
large knife and desired assistance in conducting a protective
search of the car. Id. at 19–20, 72. The officer told Alton
there had been a double-stabbing homicide in the same
vicinity approximately twenty hours earlier. Id. at 20, 72.
Alton told Vinton he was going to conduct a search for
weapons and asked twice more whether there were any
weapons in the car; Vinton first responded “no” but then
responded, “not that I know of.”  Id. at 22, 73. Alton
removed Vinton from the car and handcuffed him, but
informed him he was not under arrest. Id. at 22, 73. A search
of the passenger compartment of the car revealed two cans of
mace in the front armrest, a “butterfly knife” under the front
passenger-side floor mat, a bag of Styrofoam earplugs, and a
locked briefcase on the backseat. Id. at 23–24, 26, 73–74.
Vinton claimed he used the earplugs as sleeping aids and said
the briefcase did not belong to him and he was unaware of its
contents. Id. at 26, 74. Officer Alton phoned headquarters to
request guidance on how to proceed, and U.S. Park Police

Investigator Hodge arrived shortly thereafter. Id. at 25–27,
74. Alton briefed him on the stop and Hodge conferred with
a Park Police supervisor to assess whether Alton had probable
cause to make an arrest. Id. at 27. They determined that he
did. Id.

After placing Vinton under arrest for “possession of a

prohibited weapon,” Officer Alton pried open the locked
briefcase. Id. at 27, 29, 74–75. Inside, he found three bags of
ecstasy, three pistol magazines, a “fighting knife . . . like
brass knuckles,” and a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol,
cocked and loaded. Id. at 29, 75.

Vinton was charged in a two-count indictment with

unlawful possession with intent to distribute ecstasy, 21
U.S.C. § 841; and using, carrying and possessing a firearm
during a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He
moved to suppress all of the tangible evidence recovered, and
all of his statements made, during the traffic stop. Following
a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Mem. Op.,
United States v. Vinton, No. 06-cr-298 (Feb. 12, 2007).
Vinton was convicted by a jury of both counts and was
sentenced to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment on the first
count and sixty months’ on the second count, to run
consecutively, as well as three years’ supervised release. He
brings this appeal arguing his motion to suppress was
erroneously denied.

We review “determinations of reasonable suspicion and

probable cause . . . de novo” but “review findings of historical
fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight to inferences
drawn from those facts by” the district court. Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
C

ONST

. amend. IV. “Time and again, [the Supreme] Court

has observed that searches and seizures conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
and well delineated exceptions.” Minnesota v. Dickerson,
508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993). The government relies on several
exceptions in urging us to uphold the denial of Vinton’s
motion to suppress. We will address each issue in sequence:
Did Officer Alton have the right to search the passenger
compartment of Vinton’s car? Following this search, was
Vinton properly arrested? Was the search of the briefcase
permissible?

The Supreme Court has long “recognized that traffic

stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers”
and that the “risk of harm to both the police and the occupants
[of a stopped vehicle] is minimized if the officers routinely
exercise unquestioned command of the situation.” Arizona v.
Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 786 (2009) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (alteration in original). Thus, during a
traffic stop, in order “to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence,” Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972), the officer may order the driver out
of his car and may search the passenger compartment of the
car for weapons if the officer develops a reasonable suspicion
that the driver is “dangerous and . . . may gain immediate
control of weapons” inside the car. Michigan v. Long, 463

U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968)) (footnote omitted); see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (per curiam). Courts assess “the
totality of the circumstances . . . to see whether the detaining
officer ha[d] a particularized and objective basis” for
suspecting the driver was armed and dangerous,
acknowledging that the “likelihood of criminal activity need
not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the
evidence standard.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273–74 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the facts that accumulated within the first few

moments of the traffic stop established a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting Vinton might be armed and
dangerous. As an initial matter, Vinton does not argue that
Officer Alton had an insufficient basis for pulling him over.
Indeed, it is clear that Vinton was properly stopped because
Officer Alton’s firsthand observations gave him probable
cause to believe that Vinton had been speeding and driving
with windows tinted in excess of the legal limit. See
Suppression Tr. at 8, 69; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 810 (1996).

Most crucially, upon approaching Vinton’s car, Officer

Alton saw a knife with a five-and-a-half-inch sheath in plain
view on the backseat, easily within reaching-distance of
Vinton. See Suppression Tr. at 11–12, 25, 37, 70. “[T]he
presence of one weapon may justifiably arouse concern that
there may be more in the vicinity.” United States v.
Christian, 187 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1999). For instance,
in Long, the Supreme Court held that after the officers
observed “a large knife in the interior of the car,” they were
justified in “conduct[ing] an area search of the passenger
compartment” of the car “to ensure that there were no other

weapons” in “those areas to which Long would generally
have immediate control.” 463 U.S. at 1050–51. Similarly, in
Christian, we held that because the officer “saw [a] dagger in
plain view” when he “arrived at Christian’s car,” he “had
sufficient indication Christian might be armed and dangerous
to justify a protective search for weapons.” 187 F.3d at 669.
Like the defendants in Long and Christian, Vinton possessed
in plain view a knife capable of being used to cause serious
bodily harm. Although Officer Alton removed this knife and
placed it out of arm’s reach on the roof of Vinton’s car, he
was justifiably concerned that additional weapons might be
hidden elsewhere in the vicinity.  This concern was not abated
by ordering Vinton out of the car and handcuffing him,
because had Vinton ultimately not been arrested, he would
have been “permitted to reenter his automobile, and he
w[ould] then have [had] access to any weapons inside.”
Long, 463 U.S. at 1052.

We reject Vinton’s argument that while a dagger may

justify a protective search for additional weapons, see
Christian, 187 F.3d at 669, a sheathed knife like Vinton’s
may not. “[A] Terry investigation . . . involves a police
investigation at close range, when the officer remains
particularly vulnerable . . . [and] must make a quick decision
as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger.”
Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Officer Alton did not have time to perform a close
inspection of Vinton’s sheathed knife to determine precisely
how dangerous it was. Nor was Officer Alton required to
accept Vinton’s claim that he used the knife only for fishing
with his grandfather. For one, Alton observed no other
fishing equipment in the car that might have corroborated this
story. See Suppression Tr. at 14, 71. But regardless, even a
lawfully-possessed fishing knife can be used as a dangerous
weapon. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 n.16 (holding that

possession of lawful hunting knife contributed to reasonable
suspicion that driver was armed and dangerous). Moreover,
there was an additional reason for viewing Vinton’s
explanations with skepticism. The “thin blue line sticker” on
the back of his car, see Suppression Tr. at 8, 70—which, as
Vinton concedes, “suggested a connection with law
enforcement,” Appellant’s Br. 36—could have been viewed
as a deliberate attempt to create the false impression that
Vinton was affiliated with law enforcement. Furthermore,
while Alton’s newly-acquired knowledge of a recent double-
stabbing homicide in the same neighborhood, see Suppression
Tr. at 20, 72, was not itself sufficient to justify the protective
search, it added to the circumstances warranting Alton’s
decision to search the car to ensure his own safety.

Finally, Vinton’s argument that Officer Alton did not

subjectively believe Vinton was dangerous may easily be
rejected. Because “[t]he Fourth Amendment test is
objective,” an officer’s “actual subjective motives . . . are
irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis of [a] traffic
stop and protective search of the car.” United States v.
Washington, 559 F.3d 573, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Of course,
it was possible that Vinton used his sheathed knife only for
fishing, that he had benign reasons for having excessively
tinted windows, and that his “thin blue line” sticker was not
meant to be misleading. But “[a] determination that
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.
Examining the totality of the circumstances objectively,
Officer Alton had a reasonable belief, based on specific and
articulable facts, that Vinton was armed and dangerous. See
Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. Thus, he properly searched the
passenger compartment of Vinton’s car for additional
weapons.

“[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable

under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause
to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being
committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004).
“There is no precise formula for the probability required for
probable cause. Somewhere between ‘less than evidence
which would justify . . . conviction’ and ‘more than bare
suspicion,’ probable cause is satisfied. . . . The precise point is
indeterminate. . . . The standard is to be met by applying a
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” United States v.
Riley, 351 F.3d 1265, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

In the course of searching Vinton’s car for weapons,

Officer Alton found, among other things, a “butterfly knife”
hidden under the passenger-side floor mat. See Suppression
Tr. at 23, 73. Vinton was eventually arrested for “possession
of a prohibited weapon” (PPW), D.C. Code § 22-4514(b).
However, because the offense of PPW requires “proof of
intent to use [the weapon] unlawfully against another,” United
States v. Broadie, 452 F.3d 875, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), the
government has conceded that Officer Alton lacked probable
cause to arrest for PPW. The government nonetheless argues
the arrest was valid because there was probable cause to
believe Vinton committed the offense of “carrying a
dangerous weapon” (CDW), D.C. Code § 22-4504(a), which
“does not require proof of intent to use the weapon for an
unlawful purpose,” Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881. Because the
Fourth Amendment inquiry is objective, an officer’s
“subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the
criminal offense as to which the known facts provide
probable cause.” Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153; see also

Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881 (holding arrest was valid because
there was probable cause of CDW, even though officer
incorrectly believed at the time that he had probable cause of
PPW).

The CDW statute prohibits “carry[ing] within the District

of Columbia either openly or concealed on or about their
person . . . any deadly or dangerous weapon.” D.C. Code §
22-4504(a). As we have explained, under District of
Columbia case law, a “deadly or dangerous weapon” is
“anything that is ‘likely to produce death or great bodily
injury by the use made of it.’” Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881
(quoting Strong v. United States, 581 A.2d 383, 386 (D.C.
1990)). Two categories of objects are likely to produce such
harm: (1) those that are “inherently dangerous,” i.e., where
“the design of the object is such that in its ordinary use it is
likely to cause great bodily injury”; and (2) those that
ostensibly may be “used as a tool in certain trades or hobbies
or . . . may be carried for utilitarian reasons,” but where “the
surrounding circumstances indicate” that “the purpose of
carrying the object . . . is its use as a weapon.” Id. at 882
(quoting Strong, 581 A.2d at 386; Scott v. United States, 243
A.2d 54, 56 (D.C. 1968)).

“A butterfly knife has a split metal handle which encases

a single-edged blade. The knife is opened by folding back
both halves to expose the blade.” United States v.
Kashiwabara, 993 F.2d 885 (table), 1993 WL 148094, at *1
(9th Cir. 1993); see also Suppression Tr. at 23–24 (describing
the butterfly knife as a knife, commonly “used in martial
arts,” where the blade “folds out” from the handle).

The

The district court at one point suggested the butterfly knife had

“several different blades.” Suppression Tr. at 73. After being
corrected, the court appeared to withdraw that finding. Id. at 77–
78. Because the testimony established that the butterfly knife had

record does not establish that butterfly knives are “inherently
dangerous,” and indeed, one can imagine they might be used
for sport or entertainment. Nonetheless, the surrounding
circumstances provided Officer Alton with probable cause to
believe Vinton intended to use this knife as a dangerous
weapon. See Lewis v. United States, 767 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C.
2001) (explaining that where the knife possessed by the
defendant is not inherently dangerous, “the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . the purpose of
carrying the instrument was its use as a dangerous weapon”).

The design of a butterfly knife makes it principally useful

as an easily concealable and quickly deployable weapon
capable of injuring another person in an altercation at close
range. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 848 F.2d 715, 716,
720 (6th Cir. 1988) (butterfly knives are “most often
associated with the martial arts and with combat . . . [and are]
potentially dangerous, lethal” weapons that “can be opened
very rapidly, perhaps in less than 5 seconds” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Stroman, No.
Crim. 05-66-P-S, 2006 WL 83404, at *14 (D. Me. Jan. 9,
2006) (To deploy a butterfly knife, “[t]he wielder releases one
of the halves of the handle and through a combination of
gravity and centrifugal force, the latter generated by a
movement of the arm or wrist, the wielder swings that half of
the handle around until it meets the other half. These forces
also swing the blade into position.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Vinton never offered Officer Alton any
explanation whatsoever for his possession of this knife, and
certainly, he never suggested he was specially trained in the
use of butterfly knives for sport or entertainment purposes.
Thus, Officer Alton was entitled to rely on his common-sense

only one blade, and because both parties agree on this point, our
analysis assumes the knife had only one blade. See id. at 23, 76–
77.

assessment that Vinton probably intended to use the knife for
its most obvious purpose, fighting. Cf. Broadie, 452 F.3d at
882–83 (explaining that although an ASP baton is not
inherently dangerous, “the normal and the only apparent use
of an ASP baton . . . is to strike another” and that “a
reasonable officer surely would believe that a civilian,
presumably without police training, would likely inflict great
bodily injury when using [one]”). If anything, Vinton’s stated
profession—personal security—along with his allusion to
possessing weapons at home increased the likelihood that he
carried the butterfly knife for use as a weapon. See
Suppression Tr. at 11, 14, 71. That he may have planned to
use the knife only in self-defense or defense of another is
irrelevant, so long as he intended to use it as a weapon. See
Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881 (“[N]either self-defense nor any
other ‘lawful purpose’ is material to the offense or sufficient
to avoid liability [for CDW].” (citing Monroe v. United
States, 598 A.2d 439, 440 (D.C. 1991))).

In addition, the knife was hidden under the floor mat.

See Suppression Tr. at 23, 73. Vinton’s various
explanations—that maybe the knife fell inadvertently and
landed under the mat, or perhaps it was stashed under the mat
to prevent passersby from being enticed to break into the car
to steal it—are, of course, possible. But Officer Alton was
not unreasonable in believing that the likeliest explanation for
the knife’s concealment was that Vinton intended to use it as
a weapon and therefore wanted to hide it from police officers
and potential adversaries. Furthermore, Vinton lied about the
knife’s existence. Officer Alton asked Vinton three times
whether there were any weapons in the car other than the
sheathed knife, and each time Vinton responded in the

Vinton has not argued that the CDW statute is unconstitutional.

Therefore, we have no occasion to address the issue and our
holding expresses no view on it.

negative. See id. at 14, 22, 71, 73. This lack of candor
reasonably suggested to Officer Alton that Vinton intended to
use the butterfly knife for malicious purposes. Thus, the
totality of the circumstances provided probable cause to
believe Vinton was carrying a “deadly or dangerous weapon”
in violation of D.C. Code § 22-4504(a).

Finally, Vinton argues that any finding of probable cause

must be struck down because the facts supporting probable
cause were uncovered only after unlawfully extending the
Terry stop beyond a reasonable duration. “[A] search which
is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth
Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 18. To “assess[] whether a detention is too
long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we . . .
examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly.”  United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
686 (1985). Vinton contends that “[a]fter the frisk was
complete, the officers continued to detain Vinton for
approximately 45 minutes, including 30 minutes until
Investigator Hodge arrived on the scene and an additional 15
minutes while the[y] obtained advice from supervisors . . . .”
Appellant’s Br. 38–39. However, Vinton waived this
argument by failing to raise it before the district court. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e) (any defense or objection not raised in
a motion to suppress is waived); United States v. Redman,
331 F.3d 982, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding appellant waived
argument by failing to assert it at suppression hearing). In
any event, within the first few minutes of the traffic stop—as
soon as he found the butterfly knife—Officer Alton had
probable cause to arrest Vinton.  Thus, Alton acted promptly
and diligently to confirm his initial suspicions. His
subsequent efforts to determine precisely how to proceed

were a conscientious vindication of Vinton’s rights, not a
violation of them.

Until recently, it was widely understood that New York v.

Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), established a “bright-line
rule,” whereby “incident to arrest the police may search the
passenger compartment of an arrestee’s automobile.” United
States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also
United States v. Mapp, 476 F.3d 1012, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(“As long as the arrest of an occupant of a car is lawful, a
search of the passenger compartment is reasonable.”). But
while the instant appeal was pending, the Supreme Court
decided Arizona v. Gant, which reshaped the law governing
searches incident to arrest in the automobile context. 129 S.
Ct. at 1714. Noting that Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
763 (1969), had held that “a search incident to arrest may
only include the arrestee’s person and the area within his
immediate control,” the Court explained that a reading of
Belton that would always authorize a vehicle search incident
to an occupant’s arrest “would . . . untether the rule from the
justifications underlying the Chimel exception.” Id. at 1716,
1719 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Gant held
police may search a vehicle incident to the arrest of an
occupant only in two circumstances: (1) “when the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search” (the safety rationale);
or (2) “when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle’” (the
evidentiary rationale). Id. at 1719 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment)).

Vinton argues that Gant also applies to Terry searches. Thus, he

contends Officer Alton’s initial protective search of his car was

During the protective search of Vinton’s car, Officer

Alton found a locked briefcase on the backseat. See
Suppression Tr. at 24, 26, 74. After placing Vinton under
arrest, Alton pried it open. See id. at 29, 74–75. The
government concedes that this search incident to Vinton’s
arrest cannot be upheld under Gant’s safety rationale because
Vinton was handcuffed at the time. See Appellee’s Br. 39.
Nonetheless, the government argues the search should be
upheld under Gant’s evidentiary rationale.

  The Supreme Court did not elaborate on the
circumstances when it will be “reasonable to believe evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also id. (noting that this evidentiary rationale “does not
follow from Chimel” but is based on “circumstances unique
to the vehicle context”). Presumably, the “reasonable to
believe” standard requires less than probable cause, because
otherwise  Gant’s evidentiary rationale would merely

unconstitutional because he was handcuffed at the time of the
search. We decline to read Gant so expansively. The Supreme
Court explicitly limited its holding to the search-incident-to-arrest
context, see Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723–24, and it is doubtful that the
same rule ought to apply in the Terry search context, see id. at 1724
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“It must be borne in mind that we are
speaking here only of a rule automatically permitting a search when
the driver or an occupant is arrested. . . . In the no-arrest case, the
possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always exists, since
the driver or passenger will be allowed to return to the vehicle
when the interrogation is completed.”).

The government also argues Vinton had no reasonable expectation

of privacy in the briefcase, and consequently no protected Fourth
Amendment interest in it, because he disclaimed ownership of it.
We have no need to reach this issue.

duplicate the “automobile exception,” which the Court
specifically identified as a distinct exception to the warrant
requirement. See id. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982)). Rather, the “reasonable to
believe” standard probably is akin to the “reasonable
suspicion” standard required to justify a Terry search. See,
e.g., Adams, 407 U.S. at 146 (noting that a Terry search is
permissible if the officer “has reason to believe that the
suspect is armed and dangerous” (emphasis added)).

Accordingly, the officer’s assessment of the likelihood that
there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based
on more than “a mere hunch,” but “falls considerably short of
[needing to] satisfy[] a preponderance of the evidence
standard.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274.

The Supreme Court explained that “[i]n many cases, as

when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there
will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains
relevant evidence. But in others, including Belton and
Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for
searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle
and any containers therein.” Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719
(citation omitted). In both Belton and Thornton, the vehicle
occupants were arrested for possession of narcotics. See
Belton, 453 U.S. at 456; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618. Had
Vinton been arrested merely for speeding or driving with
excessively tinted windows, Gant’s evidentiary rationale
obviously would not have authorized a subsequent search
because under the circumstances it would have been very
unlikely that evidence relevant to either of those traffic
offenses would be found inside his car. See Gant, 129 S. Ct.
at 1719 (holding that “[a]n evidentiary basis for the search
was . . . lacking . . . [because] Gant was arrested for driving
with a suspended license—an offense for which police could
not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of

[his] car”). But instead, Vinton was arrested for the unlawful
possession of a weapon, an offense that resembles narcotics-
possession offenses far more closely than it resembles a
traffic violation. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a principled
basis for distinguishing the possession of narcotics from the
possession of an unlawful weapon, where an arrest for the
former makes it reasonable to believe additional narcotics
remain in the car, but an arrest for the latter does not make it
reasonable to believe additional weapons are in the car. In
both cases, the defendant has been caught with a type of
contraband sufficiently small to be hidden throughout a car
and frequently possessed in multiple quantities. Indeed, this
fact was well-known to Officer Alton, who testified that
“generally if one weapon is there . . . there’s the chance that
other weapons could be there.” Suppression Tr. 14; see id. at
28.

The facts of this case establish that Alton was reasonable

in expecting there might be additional weapons in the car,
particularly in the locked briefcase found on the backseat.
Most significantly, Officer Alton already had found two
knives, one of which was hidden. He also had found two cans
of mace and a bag of earplugs. See id. at 23, 26, 73–74. Of
course, earplugs often are used for purposes unrelated to
weapons, but, as Alton reasonably recognized, they also are
commonly used at firing ranges to muffle the noise from
guns. See id. at 26, 74. Thus, having found two objects,
mace and earplugs, that suggested at least a possible
association with weapons, along with two other objects, a
sheathed knife and a butterfly knife, that were clearly capable
of being used as weapons, Officer Alton had an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that additional weapons might
be inside the car. A material element of the CDW offense is
that the defendant intends to use the object as a dangerous
weapon. See Lewis, 767 A.2d at 222. Finding additional

weapons in Vinton’s possession would have provided strong
circumstantial evidence of this specific intent. Thus, because
it was “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest might be found in the vehicle,” Officer Alton had the
right to search the passenger compartment of Vinton’s car
“and any containers therein,” including the locked briefcase.

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court therefore properly admitted into evidence
the ecstasy, semiautomatic pistol, pistol magazines, and
“fighting knife” discovered inside the briefcase.

III

Vinton also argues his statements were admitted into

evidence in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda warnings are required “where
a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.” Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980). Because “ordinary
traffic stops” are “noncoercive,” “persons temporarily
detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the
purposes of Miranda.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
440 (1984). However, “[i]f a motorist who has been detained
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment
that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be
entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by
Miranda.” Id.

We note that Gant sometimes states that it must be reasonable to

believe there will be evidence “of” the offense of arrest inside the
car, and elsewhere speaks more broadly of evidence “relevant” to
the offense of arrest. Compare 129 S. Ct. at 1714, 1720–23, with
id. at 1719 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)). But relevant evidence is evidence of the
offense, see F

VID

401, so the difference in phrasing is

immaterial.

Most of the statements Vinton claims were improperly

admitted were made by him while he was sitting in his car,
before Officer Alton handcuffed him and searched his car.
This includes his statements that he worked in personal
security, used the sheathed knife only for fishing with his
grandfather, had no other weapons in the car, and “keeps that
part of his trade at home.” See Suppression Tr. at 11–12, 14,
71. At the time he made these statements, Vinton was not “in
custody” and faced an “ordinary,” “noncoercive” traffic stop.
See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440. Thus, he had no entitlement
to Miranda warnings.

Vinton also challenges the admission of two statements

he made after being handcuffed for some time but before
being formally arrested: that he used the earplugs as sleeping
aids, and that he did not own the locked briefcase or know
what was inside of it. See Suppression Tr. at 26, 74. We
need not decide whether Vinton was “in custody” at the time
he made these statements, because any Miranda violation was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Both of these
statements were wholly exculpatory and could not have
“contribute[d] to the verdict obtained.” United States v.
Harris, 515 F.3d 1307, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, even assuming a Miranda
violation occurred, there is no basis for reversal.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

Affirmed.