United States Court of Appeals 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
 
 
Argued December 10, 2009 
Decided February 5, 2010 
 
No. 07-3125 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
APPELLEE 
 
v. 
 
SAMUEL H. VINTON, JR., 
APPELLANT 
 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia 
(No. 06cr00298-01) 
 
 
 
Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 
argued the cause for appellant.  With her on the briefs was A. 
J. Kramer
, Federal Public Defender.  Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant 
Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance. 
 
James M. Perez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 
cause for appellee.  With him on the brief were Roy  W. 
McLeese III 
and Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 
 
Before: BROWN and KAVANAUGH,  Circuit Judges, and 
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge
 


 
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 
 
BROWN,  Circuit Judge: Samuel Vinton, convicted of 
narcotics and firearm offenses after the contraband was found 
in a briefcase in his car during a traffic stop, appeals the 
denial of his motion to suppress.  He argues the evidence was 
discovered during an unconstitutional search of his vehicle 
and property.  In particular, he contends that Arizona v. Gant
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), decided by the Supreme Court while 
this appeal was pending, establishes that the search of the 
briefcase cannot be upheld under the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement.  Because it was 
“reasonable to believe” evidence relevant to Vinton’s 
weapons-possession offense would be found inside the 
briefcase, we affirm. 
 

 
 
On September 9, 2006, around 9:00 p.m., U.S. Park 
Police Officer William Alton, driving a marked cruiser in 
Southeast D.C., saw a green Nissan Maxima speeding, and 
also observed that its windows were excessively tinted.  Tr. of 
Mot. Hr’g at 6, 8, 69, United States v. Vinton, No. 06-cr-298 
(D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2007) (Suppression Tr.).  As Alton followed 
the car, he noticed “a thin blue line sticker on the back of 
[the] car,” which Alton assumed referred to the driver’s 
probable affiliation with law enforcement, most likely the 
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD).  Id. at 8, 70. 
 
 
The driver promptly obeyed Alton’s signal to pull over 
and, as Alton approached the car, the driver, Vinton, lowered 
all his windows.  Id. at 10, 70.  Alton asked if Vinton was in 
law enforcement and Vinton said he worked in “personal 
security.”  Id. at 11, 71.  Alton immediately saw a knife with 
 


a five-and-a-half inch sheath on Vinton’s backseat, in “close 
proximity” to Vinton, easily within reaching-distance.  Id. at 
11–12, 25, 37, 70–71.  Vinton explained the knife was used 
when fishing with his grandfather, but Alton saw no other 
fishing equipment in the car.  Id. at 12, 14, 71.  He retrieved 
the knife and placed it on the roof of the car, “out of arm’s 
reach of the driver.”  Id. at 14, 71.  Alton asked if there were 
“any other weapons in the vehicle,” and Vinton responded 
“no, he . . . ke[pt] that part of his trade at home.”  Id. at 14, 
71.  Alton then measured the car’s windows with a tint meter 
and determined they exceeded D.C.’s seventy-percent tint 
limit.  Id. at 15–17, 71.  He returned to his cruiser to prepare a 
citation.  Id. at 17, 72. 
 
 
Officer Alton was working alone and had not called for 
Park Police backup.  However, when an MPD officer 
appeared, Alton “asked him to stop” because he had found a 
large knife and desired assistance in conducting a protective 
search of the car.  Id. at 19–20, 72.  The officer told Alton 
there had been a double-stabbing homicide in the same 
vicinity approximately twenty hours earlier.  Id. at 20, 72.  
Alton told Vinton he was going to conduct a search for 
weapons and asked twice more whether there were any 
weapons in the car; Vinton first responded “no” but then 
responded, “not that I know of.”  Id. at 22, 73.  Alton 
removed Vinton from the car and handcuffed him, but 
informed him he was not under arrest.  Id. at 22, 73.  A search 
of the passenger compartment of the car revealed two cans of 
mace in the front armrest, a “butterfly knife” under the front 
passenger-side floor mat, a bag of Styrofoam earplugs, and a 
locked briefcase on the backseat.  Id. at 23–24, 26, 73–74.  
Vinton claimed he used the earplugs as sleeping aids and said 
the briefcase did not belong to him and he was unaware of its 
contents.  Id. at 26, 74.  Officer Alton phoned headquarters to 
request guidance on how to proceed, and U.S. Park Police 
 


Investigator Hodge arrived shortly thereafter.  Id. at 25–27, 
74.  Alton briefed him on the stop and Hodge conferred with 
a Park Police supervisor to assess whether Alton had probable 
cause to make an arrest.  Id. at 27.  They determined that he 
did.  Id. 
 
 
After placing Vinton under arrest for “possession of a 
prohibited weapon,” Officer Alton pried open the locked 
briefcase.  Id. at 27, 29, 74–75.  Inside, he found three bags of 
ecstasy, three pistol magazines, a “fighting knife . . . like 
brass knuckles,” and a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol, 
cocked and loaded.  Id. at 29, 75. 
 
 
Vinton was charged in a two-count indictment with 
unlawful possession with intent to distribute ecstasy, 21 
U.S.C. § 841; and using, carrying and possessing a firearm 
during a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).  He 
moved to suppress all of the tangible evidence recovered, and 
all of his statements made, during the traffic stop.  Following 
a hearing, the district court denied the motion.  Mem. Op., 
United States v. Vinton, No. 06-cr-298 (Feb. 12, 2007).  
Vinton was convicted by a jury of both counts and was 
sentenced to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment on the first 
count and sixty months’ on the second count, to run 
consecutively, as well as three years’ supervised release.  He 
brings this appeal arguing his motion to suppress was 
erroneously denied. 
 
We review “determinations of reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause . . . de novo” but “review findings of historical 
fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight to inferences 
drawn from those facts by” the district court.  Ornelas v. 
United States
, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). 
 
 
 


II 
 
 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV.  “Time and again, [the Supreme] Court 
has observed that searches and seizures conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 
and well delineated exceptions.”  Minnesota v. Dickerson
508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993).  The government relies on several 
exceptions in urging us to uphold the denial of Vinton’s 
motion to suppress.  We will address each issue in sequence:  
Did Officer Alton have the right to search the passenger 
compartment of Vinton’s car?  Following this search, was 
Vinton properly arrested?  Was the search of the briefcase 
permissible? 
 

 
 
The Supreme Court has long “recognized that traffic 
stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers” 
and that the “risk of harm to both the police and the occupants 
[of a stopped vehicle] is minimized if the officers routinely 
exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”  Arizona v. 
Johnson
, 129 S. Ct. 781, 786 (2009) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted) (alteration in original).  Thus, during a 
traffic stop, in order “to allow the officer to pursue his 
investigation without fear of violence,” Adams v. Williams
407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972), the officer may order the driver out 
of his car and may search the passenger compartment of the 
car for weapons if the officer develops a reasonable suspicion 
that the driver is “dangerous and . . . may gain immediate 
control of weapons” inside the car.  Michigan v. Long, 463 
 


U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 
(1968)) (footnote omitted); see  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (per curiam).  Courts assess “the 
totality of the circumstances . . . to see whether the detaining 
officer ha[d] a particularized and objective basis” for 
suspecting the driver was armed and dangerous, 
acknowledging that the “likelihood of criminal activity need 
not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls 
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.”  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 
273–74 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
Here, the facts that accumulated within the first few 
moments of the traffic stop established a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting Vinton might be armed and 
dangerous.  As an initial matter, Vinton does not argue that 
Officer Alton had an insufficient basis for pulling him over.  
Indeed, it is clear that Vinton was properly stopped because 
Officer Alton’s firsthand observations gave him probable 
cause to believe that Vinton had been speeding and driving 
with windows tinted in excess of the legal limit.  See 
Suppression Tr. at 8, 69; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806, 810 (1996). 
 
Most crucially, upon approaching Vinton’s car, Officer 
Alton saw a knife with a five-and-a-half-inch sheath in plain 
view on the backseat, easily within reaching-distance of 
Vinton.  See  Suppression Tr. at 11–12, 25, 37, 70.  “[T]he 
presence of one weapon may justifiably arouse concern that 
there may be more in the vicinity.”  United States v. 
Christian
, 187 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  For instance, 
in  Long, the Supreme Court held that after the officers 
observed “a large knife in the interior of the car,” they were 
justified in “conduct[ing] an area search of the passenger 
compartment” of the car “to ensure that there were no other 
 


weapons” in “those areas to which Long would generally 
have immediate control.”  463 U.S. at 1050–51.  Similarly, in 
Christian, we held that because the officer “saw [a] dagger in 
plain view” when he “arrived at Christian’s car,” he “had 
sufficient indication Christian might be armed and dangerous 
to justify a protective search for weapons.”  187 F.3d at 669.  
Like the defendants in Long and Christian, Vinton possessed 
in plain view a knife capable of being used to cause serious 
bodily harm.  Although Officer Alton removed this knife and 
placed it out of arm’s reach on the roof of Vinton’s car, he 
was justifiably concerned that additional weapons might be 
hidden elsewhere in the vicinity.  This concern was not abated 
by ordering Vinton out of the car and handcuffing him, 
because had Vinton ultimately not been arrested, he would 
have been “permitted to reenter his automobile, and he 
w[ould] then have [had] access to any weapons inside.”  
Long, 463 U.S. at 1052. 
 
We reject Vinton’s argument that while a dagger may 
justify a protective search for additional weapons, see 
Christian
, 187 F.3d at 669, a sheathed knife like Vinton’s 
may not.  “[A] Terry investigation . . . involves a police 
investigation at close range, when the officer remains 
particularly vulnerable . . . [and] must make a quick decision 
as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger.”  
Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Officer Alton did not have time to perform a close 
inspection of Vinton’s sheathed knife to determine precisely 
how dangerous it was.  Nor was Officer Alton required to 
accept Vinton’s claim that he used the knife only for fishing 
with his grandfather.  For one, Alton observed no other 
fishing equipment in the car that might have corroborated this 
story.  See Suppression Tr. at 14, 71.  But regardless, even a 
lawfully-possessed fishing knife can be used as a dangerous 
weapon.  See  Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 n.16 (holding that 
 


possession of lawful hunting knife contributed to reasonable 
suspicion that driver was armed and dangerous).  Moreover, 
there was an additional reason for viewing Vinton’s 
explanations with skepticism.  The “thin blue line sticker” on 
the back of his car, see Suppression Tr. at 8, 70—which, as 
Vinton concedes, “suggested a connection with law 
enforcement,” Appellant’s Br. 36—could have been viewed 
as a deliberate attempt to create the false impression that 
Vinton was affiliated with law enforcement.  Furthermore, 
while Alton’s newly-acquired knowledge of a recent double-
stabbing homicide in the same neighborhood, see Suppression 
Tr. at 20, 72, was not itself sufficient to justify the protective 
search, it added to the circumstances warranting Alton’s 
decision to search the car to ensure his own safety. 
 
Finally, Vinton’s argument that Officer Alton did not 
subjectively believe Vinton was dangerous may easily be 
rejected.  Because “[t]he Fourth Amendment test is 
objective,” an officer’s “actual subjective motives . . . are 
irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis of [a] traffic 
stop and protective search of the car.”  United States v. 
Washington
, 559 F.3d 573, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Of course, 
it was possible that Vinton used his sheathed knife only for 
fishing, that he had benign reasons for having excessively 
tinted windows, and that his “thin blue line” sticker was not 
meant to be misleading.  But “[a] determination that 
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the 
possibility of innocent conduct.”  Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.  
Examining the totality of the circumstances objectively, 
Officer Alton had a reasonable belief, based on specific and 
articulable facts, that Vinton was armed and dangerous.  See 
Long
, 463 U.S. at 1049.  Thus, he properly searched the 
passenger compartment of Vinton’s car for additional 
weapons. 
 
 



 
 
“[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause 
to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being 
committed.”  Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004).  
“There is no precise formula for the probability required for 
probable cause.  Somewhere between ‘less than evidence 
which would justify . . . conviction’ and ‘more than bare 
suspicion,’ probable cause is satisfied. . . . The precise point is 
indeterminate. . . . The standard is to be met by applying a 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.”  United States v. 
Riley
, 351 F.3d 1265, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
In the course of searching Vinton’s car for weapons, 
Officer Alton found, among other things, a “butterfly knife” 
hidden under the passenger-side floor mat.  See Suppression 
Tr. at 23, 73.  Vinton was eventually arrested for “possession 
of a prohibited weapon” (PPW), D.C. Code § 22-4514(b).  
However, because the offense of PPW requires “proof of 
intent to use [the weapon] unlawfully against another,” United 
States v. Broadie
, 452 F.3d 875, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), the 
government has conceded that Officer Alton lacked probable 
cause to arrest for PPW.  The government nonetheless argues 
the arrest was valid because there was probable cause to 
believe Vinton committed the offense of “carrying a 
dangerous weapon” (CDW), D.C. Code § 22-4504(a), which 
“does not require proof of intent to use the weapon for an 
unlawful purpose,” Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881.  Because the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry is objective, an officer’s 
“subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the 
criminal offense as to which the known facts provide 
probable cause.”  Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153; see also 
 

10 
Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881 (holding arrest was valid because 
there was probable cause of CDW, even though officer 
incorrectly believed at the time that he had probable cause of 
PPW). 
 
The CDW statute prohibits “carry[ing] within the District 
of Columbia either openly or concealed on or about their 
person . . . any deadly or dangerous weapon.”  D.C. Code § 
22-4504(a).  As we have explained, under District of 
Columbia case law, a “deadly or dangerous weapon” is 
“anything that is ‘likely to produce death or great bodily 
injury by the use made of it.’”  Broadie, 452 F.3d at 881 
(quoting  Strong v. United States, 581 A.2d 383, 386 (D.C. 
1990)).  Two categories of objects are likely to produce such 
harm: (1) those that are “inherently dangerous,” i.e., where 
“the design of the object is such that in its ordinary use it is 
likely to cause great bodily injury”; and (2) those that 
ostensibly may be “used as a tool in certain trades or hobbies 
or . . . may be carried for utilitarian reasons,” but where “the 
surrounding circumstances indicate” that “the purpose of 
carrying the object . . . is its use as a weapon.”  Id. at 882 
(quoting Strong, 581 A.2d at 386; Scott v. United States, 243 
A.2d 54, 56 (D.C. 1968)). 
 
 
“A butterfly knife has a split metal handle which encases 
a single-edged blade.  The knife is opened by folding back 
both halves to expose the blade.”  United States v. 
Kashiwabara
, 993 F.2d 885 (table), 1993 WL 148094, at *1 
(9th Cir. 1993); see also Suppression Tr. at 23–24 (describing 
the butterfly knife as a knife, commonly “used in martial 
arts,” where the blade “folds out” from the handle).1    The 
                                                 
1 The district court at one point suggested the butterfly knife had 
“several different blades.”  Suppression Tr. at 73.  After being 
corrected, the court appeared to withdraw that finding.  Id. at 77–
78.  Because the testimony established that the butterfly knife had 
 

11 
record does not establish that butterfly knives are “inherently 
dangerous,” and indeed, one can imagine they might be used 
for sport or entertainment.  Nonetheless, the surrounding 
circumstances provided Officer Alton with probable cause to 
believe Vinton intended to use this knife as a dangerous 
weapon.  See Lewis v. United States, 767 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C. 
2001) (explaining that where the knife possessed by the 
defendant is not inherently dangerous, “the government must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . the purpose of 
carrying the instrument was its use as a dangerous weapon”). 
 
The design of a butterfly knife makes it principally useful 
as an easily concealable and quickly deployable weapon 
capable of injuring another person in an altercation at close 
range.  See, e.g.Taylor v. United States, 848 F.2d 715, 716, 
720 (6th Cir. 1988) (butterfly knives are “most often 
associated with the martial arts and with combat . . . [and are] 
potentially dangerous, lethal” weapons that “can be opened 
very rapidly, perhaps in less than 5 seconds” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Stroman, No. 
Crim. 05-66-P-S, 2006 WL 83404, at *14 (D. Me. Jan. 9, 
2006) (To deploy a butterfly knife, “[t]he wielder releases one 
of the halves of the handle and through a combination of 
gravity and centrifugal force, the latter generated by a 
movement of the arm or wrist, the wielder swings that half of 
the handle around until it meets the other half.  These forces 
also swing the blade into position.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Vinton never offered Officer Alton any 
explanation whatsoever for his possession of this knife, and 
certainly, he never suggested he was specially trained in the 
use of butterfly knives for sport or entertainment purposes.  
Thus, Officer Alton was entitled to rely on his common-sense 
                                                                                                     
only one blade, and because both parties agree on this point, our 
analysis assumes the knife had only one blade.  See id. at 23, 76–
77. 
 

12 
assessment that Vinton probably intended to use the knife for 
its most obvious purpose, fighting.  Cf. Broadie, 452 F.3d at 
882–83 (explaining that although an ASP baton is not 
inherently dangerous, “the normal and the only apparent use 
of an ASP baton . . . is to strike another” and that “a 
reasonable officer surely would believe that a civilian, 
presumably without police training, would likely inflict great 
bodily injury when using [one]”).  If anything, Vinton’s stated 
profession—personal security—along with his allusion to 
possessing weapons at home increased the likelihood that he 
carried the butterfly knife for use as a weapon.  See 
Suppression Tr. at 11, 14, 71.  That he may have planned to 
use the knife only in self-defense or defense of another is 
irrelevant, so long as he intended to use it as a weapon.  See 
Broadie
, 452 F.3d at 881 (“[N]either self-defense nor any 
other ‘lawful purpose’ is material to the offense or sufficient 
to avoid liability [for CDW].” (citing Monroe v. United 
States
, 598 A.2d 439, 440 (D.C. 1991))).2 
 
In addition, the knife was hidden under the floor mat.  
See  Suppression Tr. at 23, 73.  Vinton’s various 
explanations—that maybe the knife fell inadvertently and 
landed under the mat, or perhaps it was stashed under the mat 
to prevent passersby from being enticed to break into the car 
to steal it—are, of course, possible.  But Officer Alton was 
not unreasonable in believing that the likeliest explanation for 
the knife’s concealment was that Vinton intended to use it as 
a weapon and therefore wanted to hide it from police officers 
and potential adversaries.  Furthermore, Vinton lied about the 
knife’s existence.  Officer Alton asked Vinton three times 
whether there were any weapons in the car other than the 
sheathed knife, and each time Vinton responded in the 
                                                 
2 Vinton has not argued that the CDW statute is unconstitutional.  
Therefore, we have no occasion to address the issue and our 
holding expresses no view on it. 
 

13 
negative.  See  id. at 14, 22, 71, 73.  This lack of candor 
reasonably suggested to Officer Alton that Vinton intended to 
use the butterfly knife for malicious purposes.  Thus, the 
totality of the circumstances provided probable cause to 
believe Vinton was carrying a “deadly or dangerous weapon” 
in violation of D.C. Code § 22-4504(a). 
 
Finally, Vinton argues that any finding of probable cause 
must be struck down because the facts supporting probable 
cause were uncovered only after unlawfully extending the 
Terry stop beyond a reasonable duration.  “[A] search which 
is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth 
Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.”  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 18.  To “assess[] whether a detention is too 
long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we . . . 
examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of 
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly.”  United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 
686 (1985).  Vinton contends that “[a]fter the frisk was 
complete, the officers continued to detain Vinton for 
approximately 45 minutes, including 30 minutes until 
Investigator Hodge arrived on the scene and an additional 15 
minutes while the[y] obtained advice from supervisors . . . .”  
Appellant’s Br. 38–39.  However, Vinton waived this 
argument by failing to raise it before the district court.  See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e) (any defense or objection not raised in 
a motion to suppress is waived); United States v. Redman
331 F.3d 982, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding appellant waived 
argument by failing to assert it at suppression hearing).  In 
any event, within the first few minutes of the traffic stop—as 
soon as he found the butterfly knife—Officer Alton had 
probable cause to arrest Vinton.  Thus, Alton acted promptly 
and diligently to confirm his initial suspicions.  His 
subsequent efforts to determine precisely how to proceed 
 

14 
were a conscientious vindication of Vinton’s rights, not a 
violation of them. 
 

 
 
Until recently, it was widely understood that New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), established a “bright-line 
rule,” whereby “incident to arrest the police may search the 
passenger compartment of an arrestee’s automobile.”  United 
States v. Wesley
, 293 F.3d 541, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also 
United States v. Mapp, 476 F.3d 1012, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(“As long as the arrest of an occupant of a car is lawful, a 
search of the passenger compartment is reasonable.”).  But 
while the instant appeal was pending, the Supreme Court 
decided  Arizona v. Gant, which reshaped the law governing 
searches incident to arrest in the automobile context.  129 S. 
Ct. at 1714.  Noting that Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
763 (1969), had held that “a search incident to arrest may 
only include the arrestee’s person and the area within his 
immediate control,” the Court explained that a reading of 
Belton that would always  authorize a vehicle search incident 
to an occupant’s arrest “would . . . untether the rule from the 
justifications underlying the Chimel exception.”  Id. at 1716, 
1719 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, Gant held 
police may search a vehicle incident to the arrest of an 
occupant only in two circumstances: (1) “when the arrestee is 
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search” (the safety rationale); 
or (2) “when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to 
the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle’” (the 
evidentiary rationale).  Id. at 1719 (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in judgment)).3 
                                                 
3 Vinton argues that Gant also applies to Terry searches.  Thus, he 
contends Officer Alton’s initial protective search of his car was 
 

15 
 
 
During the protective search of Vinton’s car, Officer 
Alton found a locked briefcase on the backseat.  See 
Suppression Tr. at 24, 26, 74.  After placing Vinton under 
arrest, Alton pried it open.  See id. at 29, 74–75.  The 
government concedes that this search incident to Vinton’s 
arrest cannot be upheld under Gant’s safety rationale because 
Vinton was handcuffed at the time.  See Appellee’s Br. 39.  
Nonetheless, the government argues the search should be 
upheld under Gant’s evidentiary rationale.4 
 
  The Supreme Court did not elaborate on the 
circumstances when it will be “reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”  
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also id. (noting that this evidentiary rationale “does not 
follow from Chimel” but is based on “circumstances unique 
to the vehicle context”).  Presumably, the “reasonable to 
believe” standard requires less than probable cause, because 
otherwise  Gant’s evidentiary rationale would merely 
                                                                                                     
unconstitutional because he was handcuffed at the time of the 
search.  We decline to read Gant so expansively.  The Supreme 
Court explicitly limited its holding to the search-incident-to-arrest 
context, see Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723–24, and it is doubtful that the 
same rule ought to apply in the Terry search context, see id. at 1724 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“It must be borne in mind that we are 
speaking here only of a rule automatically permitting a search when 
the driver or an occupant is arrested. . . .  In the no-arrest case, the 
possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always exists, since 
the driver or passenger will be allowed to return to the vehicle 
when the interrogation is completed.”). 
 
4 The government also argues Vinton had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the briefcase, and consequently no protected Fourth 
Amendment interest in it, because he disclaimed ownership of it.  
We have no need to reach this issue. 
 

16 
duplicate the “automobile exception,” which the Court 
specifically identified as a distinct exception to the warrant 
requirement.  See id. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross
456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982)).  Rather, the “reasonable to 
believe” standard probably is akin to the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard required to justify a Terry search.  See, 
e.g.
,  Adams, 407 U.S. at 146 (noting that a Terry search is 
permissible if the officer “has reason to believe that the 
suspect is armed and dangerous” (emphasis added)). 
 
Accordingly, the officer’s assessment of the likelihood that 
there will be relevant evidence inside the car must be based 
on more than “a mere hunch,” but “falls considerably short of 
[needing to] satisfy[] a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.”  Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. 
 
The Supreme Court explained that “[i]n many cases, as 
when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there 
will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains 
relevant evidence.  But in others, including Belton and 
Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for 
searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle 
and any containers therein.”  Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 
(citation omitted).  In both Belton and Thornton, the vehicle 
occupants were arrested for possession of narcotics.  See 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 456; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618.  Had 
Vinton been arrested merely for speeding or driving with 
excessively tinted windows, Gant’s evidentiary rationale 
obviously would not have authorized a subsequent search 
because under the circumstances it would have been very 
unlikely that evidence relevant to either of those traffic 
offenses would be found inside his car.  See Gant, 129 S. Ct. 
at 1719 (holding that “[a]n evidentiary basis for the search 
was . . . lacking . . . [because] Gant was arrested for driving 
with a suspended license—an offense for which police could 
not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of 
 

17 
[his] car”).  But instead, Vinton was arrested for the unlawful 
possession of a weapon, an offense that resembles narcotics-
possession offenses far more closely than it resembles a 
traffic violation.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a principled 
basis for distinguishing the possession of narcotics from the 
possession of an unlawful weapon, where an arrest for the 
former makes it reasonable to believe additional narcotics 
remain in the car, but an arrest for the latter does not make it 
reasonable to believe additional weapons are in the car.  In 
both cases, the defendant has been caught with a type of 
contraband sufficiently small to be hidden throughout a car 
and frequently possessed in multiple quantities.  Indeed, this 
fact was well-known to Officer Alton, who testified that 
“generally if one weapon is there . . . there’s the chance that 
other weapons could be there.”  Suppression Tr. 14; see id. at 
28. 
 
The facts of this case establish that Alton was reasonable 
in expecting there might be additional weapons in the car, 
particularly in the locked briefcase found on the backseat.  
Most significantly, Officer Alton already had found two 
knives, one of which was hidden.  He also had found two cans 
of mace and a bag of earplugs.  See id. at 23, 26, 73–74.  Of 
course, earplugs often are used for purposes unrelated to 
weapons, but, as Alton reasonably recognized, they also are 
commonly used at firing ranges to muffle the noise from 
guns.  See id. at 26, 74.  Thus, having found two objects, 
mace and earplugs, that suggested at least a possible 
association with weapons, along with two other objects, a 
sheathed knife and a butterfly knife, that were clearly capable 
of being used as weapons, Officer Alton had an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that additional weapons might 
be inside the car.  A material element of the CDW offense is 
that the defendant intends to use the object as a dangerous 
weapon.  See Lewis, 767 A.2d at 222.  Finding additional 
 

18 
weapons in Vinton’s possession would have provided strong 
circumstantial evidence of this specific intent.  Thus, because 
it was “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest might be found in the vehicle,” Officer Alton had the 
right to search the passenger compartment of Vinton’s car 
“and any containers therein,” including the locked briefcase.5  
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The district court therefore properly admitted into evidence 
the ecstasy, semiautomatic pistol, pistol magazines, and 
“fighting knife” discovered inside the briefcase. 
 
III 
 
 
Vinton also argues his statements were admitted into 
evidence in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona
384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Miranda warnings are required “where 
a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.”  Rhode 
Island v. Innis
, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980).  Because “ordinary 
traffic stops” are “noncoercive,” “persons temporarily 
detained pursuant to such stops are not ‘in custody’ for the 
purposes of Miranda.”  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 
440 (1984).  However, “[i]f a motorist who has been detained 
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment 
that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be 
entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by 
Miranda.”  Id. 
 
                                                 
5 We note that Gant sometimes states that it must be reasonable to 
believe there will be evidence “of” the offense of arrest inside the 
car, and elsewhere speaks more broadly of evidence “relevant” to 
the offense of arrest.  Compare 129 S. Ct. at 1714, 1720–23, with 
id.  at 1719 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment)).  But relevant evidence is evidence of the 
offense,  see  FED.  R.  EVID.  401, so the difference in phrasing is 
immaterial. 
 

19 
 
Most of the statements Vinton claims were improperly 
admitted were made by him while he was sitting in his car, 
before Officer Alton handcuffed him and searched his car.  
This includes his statements that he worked in personal 
security, used the sheathed knife only for fishing with his 
grandfather, had no other weapons in the car, and “keeps that 
part of his trade at home.”  See Suppression Tr. at 11–12, 14, 
71.  At the time he made these statements, Vinton was not “in 
custody” and faced an “ordinary,” “noncoercive” traffic stop.  
See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.  Thus, he had no entitlement 
to Miranda warnings. 
 
 
Vinton also challenges the admission of two statements 
he made after being handcuffed for some time but before 
being formally arrested: that he used the earplugs as sleeping 
aids, and that he did not own the locked briefcase or know 
what was inside of it.  See  Suppression Tr. at 26, 74.  We 
need not decide whether Vinton was “in custody” at the time 
he made these statements, because any Miranda violation was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Both of these 
statements were wholly exculpatory and could not have 
“contribute[d] to the verdict obtained.”  United States v. 
Harris
, 515 F.3d 1307, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Thus, even assuming a Miranda 
violation occurred, there is no basis for reversal. 
 
IV 
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court is 
 
Affirmed